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As mobile computing becomes an integral part of the modern user experience, malicious
applications have infiltrated open marketplaces for mobile platforms. Malware apps
stealthily launch operations to retrieve sensitive user or device data or abuse system re-
sources. We describe a highly accurate classification approach for detecting malicious
Android apps. Our method statically extracts a data-flow feature on how user inputs trigger
sensitive API invocations, a property referred to as the user-trigger dependence. Our evalu-
ation with 1433 malware apps and 2684 free popular apps gives a classification accuracy
(2.1% false negative rate and 2.0% false positive rate) that is better than, or at least
competitive against, the state-of-the-art. Our method also discovers new malicious apps in
the Google Play market that cannot be detected by virus scanning tools. Our thesis in this
mobile app classification work is to advocate the approach of benign property enforcement,
i.e., extracting unique behavioral properties from benign programs and designing corre-
sponding classification policies.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Malicious mobile apps and vulnerable mobile computing
platforms threaten the confidentiality of personal and orga-
nization data and device integrity Davi et al. (2010); Enck et al.
(2010). Malicious applications can exfiltrate sensitive data,
abuse of system resources, and disrupt the normal usage of
the device. With the increased connectivity to organizationalared in the Proceedings
curity and Privacy. San Fr
ngineering Research Cent
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).networks, vulnerable smartphones increase the attack sur-
face of organizations, threatening the security of systems and
data at a grand scale. Recent studies show that there exist
hundreds of thousands of unique Android malware samples
belonging to over 300malware families forti-guard. Because of
the pervasive use of Android as a mobile operating system
(over 50%market share in western and some Asian countries),
solutions for detecting malicious applications in the Android
marketplace are urgently needed. Our work presents a newof the IEEE Mobile Security Technologies (MoST) workshop, in
ancisco, CA, USA. May 2012 Elish et al. (2012). This work has been
er (S2ERC), an NSF sponsored multi-university Industry/University
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cious Android applications that achieves a higher accuracy
than previously reported classification methods.
Classification solutions have been proposed to model and
approximate the behaviors of Android apps and distinguish
malicious apps from benign ones. Classification decisions are
made by analyzing apps' static (e.g., Grace et al., 2012b) or
dynamic (e.g., Amos et al. 2013) behavior features. Static fea-
tures can be extracted from intermediate code representa-
tions obtained through decompiling Android Dalvik bytecode.
Dynamic features are collected by observing the run-time
behaviors of the program. Various types of features can be
extracted fromAndroid permission, code, or execution for app
classification.
The detection accuracy of a classification method depends
on the quality of the features, e.g., how specific the features
are. The accuracy of existing Android classification solutions
is still far from ideal. The state-of-the-art classification with
pure static features gives a false negative rate (i.e., missed
detection, FN) of 9% Grace et al. (2012b). These features are
extracted through data- and control-flow analyses. Hybrid
features (i.e., a combination of static and dynamic features)
extracted from programs give a better FN rate 4.2% Zhou et al.
(2012) (e.g., dynamic features related to dynamic code loading
and native code invocation). Most of the dynamic classifica-
tion solutions give 10% or higher false positive rates (FP) while
trying tomaintain a reasonable FN rate, e.g., 10% FP in Shabtai
et al. (2012) and 15% FP in Amos et al. (2013). The false positive
rate tells the percentage of benign apps wrongfully classified
as malicious.
This work presents a high-precision Android app classifi-
cation method based on one complex feature that leverages
the dependence effects of program behaviors. Specifically, we
extract the definition-and-use (i.e., def-use) data dependence
properties related to sensitive operations and their user trig-
gers in the app. Smartphone apps (Android, iOS, or Windows
Phone) are unique in their user-centered and interaction-
intensive design, in which operations typically require initia-
tion by users' specific actions (or triggers). Our classification
leverages the dependence relations between user inputs/ac-
tions and sensitive API calls providing critical system func-
tions. Our feature extracted from programs reflects the
expected causal relations in the execution.
Our classification recognizes legitimate and desirable
behavioral patterns in programs, as opposed to identifying
malicious patterns. Those behaviors are commonly found in
trustworthy programs, but not in malware. Our classification
is based on whether or not a program possesses these benign
properties.
Specifically, we analyze the def-use graph to extract a
TriggerMetric feature for each API call. The TriggerMetric
feature statically approximates whether or not the occur-
rences of the call (i.e., call sites) are triggered by the user.
Specifically, the TriggerMetric value represents the number of
valid call sites among all the call sites of a specific API. The
validity of an API call is defined based on def-use semantics; a
call is valid if at least one of the call's arguments depends on
some user input(s). In other words, the TriggerMetric values of
an app reflect the degree of sensitive operations that are
triggered or intended by the user. The classification decision ismade based on TriggerMetric values (i.e., an app is classified
as malware if it has an overwhelming number of triggerless
sensitive operations).
Our contributions are summarized as follows.
 We present a new Android app classification method that
uses one complex feature rather than multi-feature as in
the existing malware detection methods which focus on
the presence of simple features such as permission or API
call. The TriggerMetric feature captures the static depen-
dence relations between user inputs/actions and sensitive
operations providing critical system functions in pro-
grams. This feature is extracted through nontrivial
Android-specific static program analysis and is used in
several quantitative analytical methods.
 Our experimental evaluations on 2684 free popular apps
and 1433 malicious apps suggest that our rule-based clas-
sification with the single feature of user-trigger depen-
dence is very effective. It detects 97.9% of themalware apps
with a low (2.0%) false positive rate.
 Our analysis reveals hundreds of malicious apps in the
Google Play market, some of which were previously unre-
ported and were not detected by any of the 48 VirusTotal1
scanners.
The purpose of our work is not to advocate the use of fewer
features in program classification. Multiple classification tools
and features should be utilized to paint a comprehensive
picture about a program.
Rather, our thesis in this mobile app classification work is
to advocate the approach of benign property enforcement.
Our analysis verifies whether or not a program is in compli-
ance with our benign-property standards. In the face of rapid
malware evolution, this type of benign-property enforcement
may yield a more proactive defense than the malware-
oriented detection approaches.2. Overview and definitions
Our classification methodology aims at exposing possible
privileged actions of apps that are not intended by the user
and lack proper dependences in the code. In this section, we
give the description of how the trigger-based dependence feature
is extracted from programs through static program analysis.
We also discuss several metrics formed from our feature
analysis.
2.1. Data dependence graph
A data dependence graph (DDG) is a common program anal-
ysis structure which represents inter-procedural flows of data
through a program Horwitz et al. (1990). The DDG is a directed
graph representing data dependence between program in-
structions, where a node represents a program instruction
(e.g. assignment statement), and an edge represents the data
dependence between two nodes. The data dependence edges
are identified by data-flow analysis. A direct edge fromnode n1
void onCreate( )
void sendsms(“1066156686”, “8”, “ ”) 
void sendsms(Str p0, Str p1, Str p2) 
r0 = @p0: String r1 = @p1: String r2 = @p2: String
android.telephony.SmsManager.sendTextMessage(r0, r1, r2, …)
Fig. 2 e Partial abstract dependence graph for HippoSMS
malware. There is no direct path showing a dependency
between user triggers and sendTextMessage().
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 4 9 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 5 5e2 7 3 257to node n2, which is denoted by n 1/ n2, means that n2 uses
the value of variable x which is defined by n1.
Formally, let I be the set of instructions in a program P. The
data dependence graphG for program P is denoted byG¼ [I, E],
where E represents the directed edges in G, and a directed
edge Ii/ Ij2 E if there is a def-use path from instructions Ii to
Ij with respect to a variable x in P.
We show two DDG examples to motivate our data-flow
analysis based on the dependence relations. The first
example is a legitimate app for sending SMS messages. Fig. 1
shows its partial def-use dependence graph. The graph in-
dicates that the API call sendTextMessage() depends on the
some inputs from the user, as one of its argument is entered
by the user via text fields, through getText() API. There are
direct dependence paths between user inputs (e.g., data and
actions) and the sendTextMessage() API.
Another example is about a real-world Android malware
HippoSMS, which affects Android smartphones by subscribing
to premium SMS services. The malware sends SMS messages
to a hard-coded premium-rated number without the user's
knowledge. Fig. 2 shows a partial def-use dependence graph
for HippoSMS. It shows the dependence relations associated
with the arguments to a sensitive API call sendTextMes-
sage(). Specifically, Fig. 2 shows that sendSMS(p0, p1, p2)
method is called with a hard-coded premium-rated number
1066156686 as its p0 argument. The subsequent sendSMS
method calls a sensitive API sendTextMessage() with the
same hard-coded value p0 as its phoneNum argument. There is
no direct dependence path between the sendTextMessage()
API call and any user inputs (e.g., data and actions).
We accurately extract these types of dependence proper-
ties and quantify them for classification. Existing program
analysis solutions cannot be directly applied to solve the
problem, in part because of the lack of proper handling of
Android-specific features such as Intents. In our work, we
formalize the security problem of dependence-based app
classification, and design efficient algorithms for parsing large
specialized dataedependence graphs for extracting the
trigger-based dependence feature. We refine our data-
edependence graph with reachability analysis obtained from$r3.setOnClickListener(…)
android.telephony.SmsManager.sendTextMessage(r6, null, r8, null, null)
r6 = android.widget.EditText.getText( )
void onCreate( )
void onClick(…)
r8 = android.widget.EditText.getText( )
$r3 = android.widget.Button button
Fig. 1 e Partial abstract dependence graph for a legitimate
app. sendTextMessage() has the required user
dependence property. User triggers are shown in green
nodes.control-flow analysis. The reachability analysis prunes un-
used code for high program analysis accuracy. The workflow
of our analysis is shown in Fig. 3.
2.2. TriggerMetric tuple per operation
In this section, we give the definitions for the terminology
used in our classification, including operation, trigger, depen-
dence path, and valid call site. For each operation in a program,
we give our definition for the TriggerMetric tuple, which rep-
resents properties associated with call sites of the operation.
An operation is an API call which refers to a function call
providing system service such as network I/O, file I/O, tele-
phony services in the program. We focus on a subset of
function calls e the critical API calls that can be used for
accessing private data and utilizing system resources.
Examples of the operations in our analysis are send/receive
network traffic, create/read/write/delete operations for files,
insert/update/delete operations in database and content pro-
vider, execute system commands using java.lang. Runti-
me.exec, access and return private information such as
location information and phone identifiers, and send text
messages in telephony services.
A trigger refers to a user's input or action/event on the app.
A trigger is a variable defined in the program. For example, the
user's input may be text entered via a text field, while the
user's action/event is any click on UI element, such as a but-
ton. Relevant API calls in UI objects that return a user's input
value or listen to user's action/event are defined as triggers.
Our classification is based on analyzing unauthorized
privileged operations that are not intended by the user.
Because the analysis is automated (i.e., without any user
participation), user-intention needs to be approximated. In
our analysis user-intention is embodied in the trigger vari-
ables. We specify the names of functions corresponding to
triggers and operations in the program analysis.
A valid dependence path is a (directed) dependence path
between a trigger and an operation in a data dependence
graph (DDG). In our static data-flow semantics, the path
specifies a definition-and-consumption (def-use) relation,
where a trigger is defined and later used as an argument to an
operation. The existence of a valid dependence path means
that the operation depends on a user trigger.
Android 
Application 
(.apk)
Preprocessing Construct Dependence 
Graph
Identify Dependence 
Paths
Benign App
Reachability 
Analysis
Identify User 
Triggers & 
Sensitive APIs 
Backward Depth-
First Search
Data Dependence 
Analysis
Android-specific 
Control-flow 
Analysis
Extract 
AndroidManif-
est.xml
Java Bytecode
(.class)
Aggregate for 
DPVC Vector 
Aggregate for 
Assurance 
Score
Compute TriggerMetric
Feature Extraction
Classification 
Rule 2
Classification 
Rule 1
Rule-based Classification
Malicious App
Fig. 3 eWorkflow of our analysis.
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gram, each having two call sites (i.e., each call occurs twice in
the program), s1 and s2 for c, s01 and s
0
2 for c
0. Three dependence
paths are valid, with proper user triggers on the paths,
whereas a valid dependence path for call site s02 does not exist.
The trigger may be transformed before being used as an
argument in the operation, thus the dependence path be-
tween themmay be long. In Section 3 we present our detailed
program analysis and graph algorithms.
A valid call site s of an operation c is a call site that has a
valid user-trigger dependence path. A call site is the occur-
rence of an operation. An operationmay have one ormore call
sites in a program.
Definition 1. TriggerMetric feature is a two-item tuple <k, l> for an
operation c in a program, where.
 k is the number of valid call sites of operation c, and
 l is the total number of call sites of operation c.
For the example in Fig. 4, the TriggerMetric values for op-
erations c and c0 are <2, 2> and <1, 2>, respectively. For an app
with n distinct operations, there are n TriggerMetric tuplesFig. 4 e Illustration of dependence paths and various metrics fo
operation has two call sites s1 and s2 and s01 and s
0
2, respectively
from some user trigger to a call site. A dashed line represents t
trigger.associate with it, <k1, l1>, …, <kn, ln>, one corresponding to
each operation.2.3. Aggregated metrics
One can compute several useful values aggregated from the n
TriggerMetric tuples of a program. These aggregated metrics
provide a behavioral summary of the program. Intuitively, the
assurance score V is a single value for an app representing the
portion of call sites that are intended by the user across all
operations in the app.
Definition 2. Assurance scoreV 2 [0%, 100%] of a program is the
percentage of valid call sites out of the total number of call sites
across all the operations.Given the n TriggerMetric tuples {<ki, li>} of
a program, where ki is the number of valid call sites and li is the
number of total call sites for operation i, and n is the total number of
distinct operations, V is computed as follows.
V ¼
Pn
i¼1kiPn
i¼1li
(1)r a program having two distinct operations c and c′. Each
. A solid line represents the existence of a dependence path
hat none of the call site's dependence paths has a user
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sites in the program, among which 3 are valid.
One can also compute the distribution associated with
TriggerMetric values in a program, which provides useful in-
sights into the program's behaviors.
Definition 3. DPVC Vector W of a program is the normalized Dis-
tribution of the Percentages of Valid Call sites per operation. For
operation i, the percentage of valid number of call sites is defined as
ki/li,where ki is the number of valid call sites and li is the number of
total call sites for the operation i. Let n be the total number of distinct
operations in the program.
Each percentage value determines the bin whose contents are
augmented by one. After all percentage values are distributed, the
value of each bin is divided by n, the total number of operation in the
program. This yields a normalized distribution. Specifically, the
distribution of the n percentage values {k1/l1,…, kn/ln} is represented
by the following 12 bins: 0%, (0%, 10%), [10%, 20%), [20%, 30%),…,
[90%, 100%), 100%.
For the example in Fig. 4 (n ¼ 2), the percentages of valid
number of call sites for the two operations (c and c0) are 100%
(2/2) and 50% (½), respectively. Thus, most of the corre-
sponding DPVC vector is 0, except for bins (50%, 60%) and
100%, i.e., one count in the [50%, 60%) bin, and one count in the
100% bin. After normalization, the entry for both the 100% bin
and [50%e60%) bin is 0.5. Therefore, the final normalized
distribution vector is {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.5}, whose
components are summed to 1.
The DPVC vector is computed from the TriggerMetric
feature. Intuitively, it provides the in-depth statistics on the
dependence-based validity of the calls in the program. The
vector is used in our classification in Section 4, where we
compare the DPVC vector of an unknown app with ones of
known malware apps to infer their behavior similarities.
2.4. Program analysis for feature extraction
The TriggerMetric feature is extracted from programs through
static program analysis. In this section, we justify our use of
data-flow analysis (as opposed to control-flow analysis) for
this purpose. Our method tracks how a user's input propa-
gates throughout the program using data-flow analysis. Alter-
natively, one may attempt to capture how the user control
action leads to a sensitive API call, which requires control-flow
analysis.
For our trigger-based dependence analysis, data-flow
analysis is more appropriate than control-flow. For example,
control-flow analysis cannot be used to track the user's input
(data) that is used as arguments in sensitive API calls. How-
ever, data-flow analysis alone may overestimate the de-
pendences due to the lack of the control analysis on branches
(e.g., if). In this work, our feature is extracted from data-flow
dependence analysis, which is coupled with event-specific
control-flow dependence analysis. Our approach can be
generalized to comprehensive control-flow analysis for
improved accuracy.
Our dependence analysis tracks the propagation of triggers
through events, including Android Intent. Intent is an event-
based mechanism for communication between applicationsor components (Activity, Service, Receiver) in Android. For
example, information entered by the user in one Activity may
be passed through an Intent to another Activity or Service for
processing. Therefore, the dependence graph needs to be
augmented in order to obtain the complete set of operations
that depend on trigger variables through events. Without this
expansion, the dependence analysis may underestimate the
dependence relations (i.e., fail to report legitimate trigger-
operation dependence relations). Because of our focus is on
dependences related to user activities, we perform Intent-
specific control-flow analysis, as opposed to general control-
flow analysis.
Next, we give a detailed description of the techniques used
in our program analysis. The program analysis outputs Trig-
gerMetric values for all the sensitive operations in the pro-
gram. Then in Section 4, we present our classification method
based on the TriggerMetric values. Our evaluation results are
given in Section 5.3. Feature extraction using dependence
analysis
We present in detail our technique used for extracting the
TriggerMetric feature from Android applications. To that end,
we generate and analyze the data dependence graph,
including i) the general data-flow dependences, ii) the event-
specific data dependence analysis for handling Android
Intent and gathering comprehensive data dependence infor-
mation, iii) reachability analysis for pruning unused code, and
iv) backward depth-first search for finding dependence paths
and computing a TriggerMetric for each operation.
Our programanalysis takes as inputs the trigger set and the
operation set, which are manually selected based on their
semantics. The output of the program analysis is a set of
TriggerMetric values {<kc, lc>}, one value for each sensitive
operation c, e.g., sendTextMessage().
The pseudocode of our procedure for computing Trigger-
Metric values of a program is shown in Algorithm 1.
We first describe our construction of the dependence graph
based on explicit def-use relations. The basic DDG graph is
then augmented in order to capture def-use relations due to
events.
3.1. General-purpose data-flow dependence
We use data-flow analysis to construct the data dependence
graph (DDG) with intra- and inter-procedural call connectivity
information to track the dependences between the definition
and use of user-generated data in a given program. The intra-
procedural dependence edges are identified based on local
use-def chains. On the other hand, the inter-procedural
dependence edges are identified based on constructing a
call-site context-sensitive call graph supported by points-to
analysis to build accurate call graphs. Context-sensitive analysis
differentiates calling contexts of a function during analysis.
Context-insensitive analysis analyzes a function summarizing
over all calling contexts.
Thus, a context-insensitive analysis may not provide as
accurate a solution.
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 4 9 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 5 5e2 7 3260The above general-purpose data-flow analysis does not
cover the data-flow associated with events, as Android event
communications are usually implicit. To achieve a compre-
hensive dependence coverage, we describe our technique for
the necessary event-specific dependence analysis next.
3.2. Augmentation with event-specific data dependence
Our augmented analysis handles two types of events e i) im-
plicit method invocation (e.g., through listeners in GUI) and ii)
Android-specific Intent-based inter-app or inter-component
events. Our approach is to perform necessary control-flow
analysis, which finds bridges between disjoint graph compo-
nents, so that one can obtain the complete reachability oftriggers. We describe our Android Intent-based dependence
analysis that tracks the control-flow among Intent-sending
methods in intra- and inter-application communication.
This Intent-specific control-flow analysis is necessary for
capturing data dependence relations between triggers and
operations across multiple apps and their components.
Android Intent can declare a component name, an action
and optionally includes data or extra data. For example, an
Intent can be used to start a new activity by invoking the
startActivity(Intent i) or startActivityForResult
(Intent i,…)methods. An Intent should be sent to a target
component by matching the Intent's fields with the declara-
tion of the target component in the manifest. Android Intents
can be used for explicit or implicit communication. An explicit
2 We augmented Soot libraries to support the inter-procedural
call dependence analysis.
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component specified by the Intent, whereas an implicit Intent
requests the delivery to any component that supports a
desired operation.
For explicit Intent, where the target component name is
specified,wefirst identify the source componentand the target
component that are linked through an Intent object. This step
pinpoints the Intent creation and sending methods (e.g.,
startActivity(Intent i) and sendBroadcast(Intent i))
to capture the control-flow dependences between the source
and target components. In particular, we analyze the Intent
object constructor to extract thenameof the target component
if it is provided. If it is not provided, we search the parameters
in the setClass(), setComponent() or setAction()
methods on the Intent object, which specify the target's name
to obtain the target component. Given this information, the
dependence graph is augmented by adding a directed edge
from the Intent-sending method of the source component to
the entry point of the target component. This analysis is per-
formed for all explicit Intents created in a given application.
For an implicit Intent, the target component can be any
component that declares its ability to handle a specified ac-
tion. The target component is determined by the Android
system based on the manifest file. We handle the implicit
Intent by analyzing the AndroidManifest.xml file to extract a
list of components with their actions to identify the target
component. Implicit method invocation, such as those in the
GUI, must be accounted for in the dependence graph. Our
approach is to connect the dependent calls to the relevant API
calls related to threads and listeners with their callee in the
graph. For example, Button.setOnClickListener() is
linked with an implicit call to its event handler implementa-
tion onClick(). We identified a list of all event handlers from
Android developer documentation for our analysis. These
methods effectively augment the general-purpose data
dependence graph with the necessary Android event-specific
data-flow information.
Obfuscation, Java reflection, and dynamic code loading
cannot be analyzed statically. Dynamic analysis approaches
(e.g., Newsome and Song, 2005; Yin et al., 2007) are needed to
extract related runtime behavioral features.
3.3. Reachability analysis
The above operations produce a flow- and context-sensitive
data-flow dependence graph with intra- and inter-procedural
dependence analysis, and intra-and inter-application Intent-
based dependence analysis. We then perform a reachability
analysis for the app in order to removeunreachable code “dead
code”. Unreachable code is a portion of the program which
contains classes/methods that are not executed. To that end,
we construct an inter- and intra-procedural control-flowgraph
which shows all the possible execution paths. Given this
control-flow graph and the list of user triggers and sensitive
API calls, we perform reachability analysis to identify reach-
able user triggers and sensitive API calls from the entry points
of the app. Specifically, we trace forward from the given entry
point looking for the identified user triggers and sensitive API
calls. For example, we perform reachability analysis to check
whether a certain user trigger, e.g. click button, is reachablefrom the main activity. An activity is a visible portion of an
application which handles user interaction.
There might be some user triggers inside other activities,
but these activities never get executed or called from the
main/parent activity. Hence, there is no reachable path from
the entry point and these user triggers, and they can be safely
ignored to increase the precision of our analysis. Similarly,
some sensitive API calls may not be reachable from the entry
points and never get executed. For example, a sensitive API
getLastKnownLocation() in a tool app is unreachable from
the apps entry points, and therefore will not be executed.
Thus, we ignore and call it unreachable sensitive API call.
On the other hand, we call user trigger or sensitive API call
reachable if there is a reachable path from thegivenentry point
to this user trigger or sensitive API call. For example, assume
that there is a sensitive API sendTextMessage() identified in a
service component in app SendSMS. A service is an invisible
portionofanapplicationwhichperformsbackgroundtask.This
servicewill be called from themain activity upon user clicks on
a button. In this case, the sensitive API identified inside the
service component will be executed. Thus, there is a reachable
path from the main activity entry point to this sendTextMes-
sage(), and hence we call it reachable sensitive API call.
As explained above, some user triggers and sensitive API
calls may not be reachable and hence can be ignored in our
analysis. Our subsequent dependence analysis will only be
performedon reachable components. The reachability analysis
increasestheanalysisprecisionbyexcludingunreachablecode.
3.4. Finding user-trigger dependence paths
Once the dependence graph is constructed, the next step is to
identify paths between user trigger and sensitive API call
pairs. We scan the graph for the occurrences of call sites of
sensitive operations. In Algorithm 1, checkPath Existence()
performs this task by performing backward depth-first
traversal. For each call site si of an operation c, we perform
the backward tracing from si on the dependence graph
searching for any user triggers on the dependence paths. For
each c, we record the valid number kc of call sites, and the total
number lc of call sites. <kc, lc> is output as the TriggerMetric of
the call c, according to Definition 1.
Our implementation of the static analysis framework uti-
lizes libraries in Soot, a static analysis toolkit for Java soot. Our
framework analyzes Java bytecode or source code.
Our DDG construction improves the def-use analyses pro-
vided by Soot.2 Our prototype propagates def-use relations
across the boundaries of methods. Our current prototype dose
not analyze native libraries. Yet, our approach can be gener-
alized to analyze native code.4. Classification method
The classification decisions are based on the assurance score
V and DPVC vector W of an app. An app is classified as either
benign or malicious. These values are computed from the
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Definitions 2 and 3. Because of the simplicity of our feature,
our classification is based on rules. In addition to classification
decisions, our analysis also reports the names of operations
with invalid call sites in the program.
Specifically, given the TriggerMetric values obtained from
the program analysis, our classification has three steps: i)
computing V and W, ii) preliminary classification based on V
with respect to a pre-defined threshold T, and iii) further
classification based on the weighted similarity analysis be-
tween vectorW and those of known malware samples. In the
next section, we present our two classification rules.4.1. Our classification rules
4.1.1. Classification with assurance score
The threshold-based classification Rule 1 aims to detect apps
that have low assurance scores, indicating the existence of a
large portion of invalid call sites without proper user triggers.
Rule 1. Given the assurance score V of an Android app and an
assurance threshold T2 (0, 100%], if V < T, then the app is classified
as malware. Otherwise, it is classified as benign.
Clearly, the choice of T affects the accuracy of the classi-
fication. In our experiments in Section 5, we found that a
threshold of 75% gives a proper balance between the false
positives (FP) and false negatives (FN). Probable malware
needs to be further inspected.
For each app, we also applied the similarity-based classi-
fication rule.
4.1.2. Weighted similarity analysis on DPVC vector
This classification compares the DPVC vector of an app with
the DPVC vectors of known malware samples. The purpose isFig. 5 e Averaged DPVC vectors representing a fine-grained dis
apps (top) and 2684 free popular apps (bottom).to detect the apps who have similar distributions with malware
in terms of the valid call sites. To that end, we first computed
the DPVC vector Wi for each malware i 2 [1, m] in a known
malware sample set of sizem. Then, we computed the average
DPVC vector, which is denoted byM; that is, for each itemMj in
vector M, Mj is computed as in Equation (2).
Mj ¼
Pm
i¼1W
i
j
m
(2)
Vector M represents the average distribution of the per-
centage of valid call sites per operation among the known
malware.
Rule 2. Given the DPVC vector W of an app, the average malware
DPVC vector M, a similarity function f, and a threshold T0, if f(W,
M)  T0, then the app is classified as malware. Otherwise, it is
classified as benign.
Any similarity function may be used on DPVC vectors. In
our experiments, we used a weighted cosine similarity func-
tion Tan et al. (2006). The function computes the cosine sim-
ilarity between vectors W and M, while applying weights to
the ranges with smaller percentage values, namely 0% and
(0, 10%). The weights are computed based on an exponential
function 2x and then are normalized.
The reason for choosing the exponential weight function
for this similarity measure is that we observed that the
malware apps have a distinct distribution pattern from the
legitimate apps towards the low percentage region, as shown
in Fig. 5. The weights amplify this distinction in the
classification.
Definition 4. A program is classified as benign if it is classified as
benign by both Rule 1 and Rule 2. Otherwise, it is classified as
malicious.tribution of per-operation valid call sites for 1433 malware
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classification rules on the thousands of apps studied. We also
painstakingly performed necessary manual inspections on
some apps to validate our results and identified the causes of
inaccuracies.
In the next section, we present category of features derived
from our TriggerMetric value which can be used for classifi-
cation as well.
4.2. Variations of classification rules
Our classification rules are based on aggregated statistics on
valid call sites of a program. One can define other classifica-
tion rules using the TriggerMetric values {<k, l>} of a program.
These rules may reflect different degrees of user-trigger
dependence that is required in a trustworthy application.
To demonstrate the generality of the TriggerMetric feature,
in this sectionwe describe two examples of such classification
rules, namely All-Valid-Call-Sites Rule and Any-Valid-Call Site
Rule. Both rules defined below are based on the number of valid
call sites kiwith respect to the total number of call sites li for an
operation i in the program.
Rule 3. All-Valid-Call-Sites Rule. A program is classified as
benign, if and only if all the call sites of all the sensitive operations
are valid, i.e., having user-trigger dependence. If ki ¼ li c sensitive
operation i, then the program is benign. Otherwise, the program is
classified as malicious.
This above rule is equivalent to setting assurance
threshold T to 100% in our classification Rule 1. In our exper-
iments, there are 80.5% (2162) of apps that have 100% assur-
ance scores. We conjecture that such a rule leads to low or
zero missed detection, but many false positives.
A more relaxed classification rule can be defined below,
which only requires at least one valid call site per sensitive
operation.
Rule 4. Any-Valid-Call-Site Rule. A program is classified as
benign, if for each sensitive operation there is at least one valid call
site. If ki 1c sensitive operation i, then the program is classified as
benign. Otherwise, the program is classified as malicious.
For the example in Fig. 4, this program is classified as
malicious by Rule 3 and benign by Rule 4. In-depth compari-
son of the impact of these various classification rules and
thresholds on Android security will be our future work.
In our experimental evaluation, the classification decisions
are based on Rule 1 and Rule 2.3 http://virusshare.com/.
4 The malware naming convention follows Zhou and Jiang
(2012).5. Experimental evaluation
The objective of our evaluation is to answer the following
questions:
1. Do the distributions of the assurances scores of malware
and benign apps significantly differ?
2. What is the false negative (i.e., missed detection) ratewhen
classifying known malware samples?3. Can our method discover newmalware apps that have not
been previously reported?
4. What are the reasons for false positives?5.1. Experiment setup
We performed an evaluation with 1433 Androidmalware apps
collected by Zhou and Jiang (2012) and VirusShare.3 The
known Android malware apps perform malicious functional-
ities, such as sending unauthorized SMS messages (e.g.,
FakePlayer), subscribing to premium-rate messaging services
automatically (e.g., RogueSPPush), listening to SMS-based
commands to record and upload the victim's current loca-
tion (e.g., GPSSMSSpy), stealing users' credentials (e.g., Fake-
Netflix), and granting unauthorized root privilege to some apps
(e.g., Asroot and DroidDeluxe).4
We also evaluated 2684 free popular real-world Android
apps from Google Play market, covering various application
categories. These free apps include those with different levels
of popularity as determined by the user rating scale. In
particular, we used 1039 high popularity apps, 713 interme-
diate popularity apps, and 932 low popularity apps. We
assumed that the trustworthiness of these free apps is un-
known and they may be malware or may contain malicious
components. We converted Android app code (apk) from the
.dex format to .class files using the Dare tool Octeau et al.
(2012) and extracted features from the Java bytecode.
5.1.1. Averaged DPVC vector of known malware
We computed the DPVC vector for each of the 1433 malware
samples, and then computed their average DPVC vector ac-
cording to Equation (2). The average malware DPVC vector ap-
proximates thedistributionof valid call sites inmalicious apps.
It was used for the similarity test of unknown apps in Rule 2.
5.1.2. Thresholds for classification rules
For our two classification rules (Section 4), we choose the
assurance threshold T to be 75% for Rule 1 and the similarity
threshold T' to be 0.8 for Rule 2. Empirical results showed that
these values provide a high detection rate without producing
excessive false alerts.
5.2. Known malicious apps
Assurance Scores of Known Malware. Most of the malware apps
have low assurance scores, indicating that a significant
number of sensitive API calls are made without proper user
triggers. Invalid call sites that we observed include those for
writing and sending information through the network,
sending unauthorized SMS messages, executing system
commands, and accessing user's private data. E.g., Asroot and
BaseBridge use Runtime.exec() to execute system commands
without valid user triggers.
We found that 479 malware apps out of 1433 apps have 0%
assurance scores. The rest of the 954 apps have positive
Fig. 6 e Distinct distributions of assurance scores (V) for known malicious apps and free popular apps.
Table 1 e Summary of classification results on 1433
known malware apps. Rule 2 is applied to the apps that
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repackaged from benign apps,5 e.g., ADRD, DroidDream, and
Geinimi. Malware writers bundle malicious code with existing
benign apps. Repackaging explains our observation that a
significant number of malware apps (954 out of 1433) have
non-zero assurance scores. Positive assurance scores indicate
that a portion of the sensitive operations in these malware
apps exhibit the required dependences on user triggers.
FakeNeflix is the only malware app that has a 100%
assurance score. FakeNetflix is a phishing app, which pro-
vides a fake user interface to trick the user to enter her or his
Netflix credential. This type of phishingmalware circumvents
virtually all behavior-based detection approaches, including
ours. App certification and user education are more effective
defenses than program analysis for this type of social engi-
neering malware.
The detailed distribution of the assurance scores for the
known malicious apps can be found in Fig. 6.
5.2.1. Classification results on known malware
The classification results on knownmalware apps are given in
Table 1. Using assurance scores, Rule 1 labels most (92.5%) of
the samples as malicious, as they have lower-than-75% V
values. Rule 1 labels 108 apps (7.5%) as probably benign. Using
DPVC vectors, Rule 2 labels malicious for 5.4% (77) apps out of
the 108 probably benign cases, as these apps have low per-
centages for valid call sites per operation. Thus, we correctly
detect 97.9% of the 1433malware samples. The false negative
rate is 2.1%, i.e., 31 malware apps are misclassified as benign.5 The problem of detecting repackage apps (e.g., Crussell et al.
(2012)) has a more specific goal from our general app classifica-
tion. It typically requires graph-based pair-wise app similarity
analysis.The main reason for misclassification is malware repack-
aged from existing benign code, resulting in malware with
profiles similar to benign apps. For example, one of the 31
undetected malware apps is DroidKungFuSapp, which con-
tains malicious code bundled with com.aijiaoyou.an-
droid.sipphone (an app for learning Chinese). As a result,
this malware app has a high assurance score V of 85.7% and a
low similarity value (0.015) with known malware.
There are two possible countermeasures to combat the
misclassification of repackaged malware apps. The first
countermeasure is to adjust the rules thresholds used for the
classification. For example, we set a threshold for rule 1
(assurance score V) to 75% in our evaluation. One can raise
this threshold to be 90% or more. In this case, the repackaged
malware such as DroidKungFuSapp with assurance score V of
85.7% will be detected.
A more advanced countermeasure is to separate and
identify the original benign portion of the app and the injected
malicious code. In any repackaged app, the malicious com-
ponents are highly communicated/connected together and
loosely connected with other benign components. Hence, one
possible way to identify this is to analyze the connectivity of
the call graph of a repackaged app to identify the loosely
connected or disconnected graph components. Then, one canare classified as benign by Rule 1. The false negative (FN)
rate refers to the portion of malware apps classified as
benign by both rules and is 2.1%.
Rule 1 (V) Rule 2 (DPVC)
Malicious Benign Malicious Benign (FN)
92.5% 7.5% 5.4% out of 7.5% 2.1% out of 7.5%
Table 3 e Assurance scores of subset of selected benign
apps including or excluding the ads/analytics libraries.
App name Including
ads libs
Excluding
ads libs
com.canadadroid.fantasy 75.0% 100.0%
com.canadadroid.penguinskiing 79.2% 100.0%
com.CalcFinalProgress 85.2% 96.3%
AzureNightwalker.ContactList 89.7% 97.4%
Table 4e Summary of classification results after applying
both rules on 2684 free popular apps.
Rule 1 (V)
Malicious Benign
7.2% 92.8%
Rule 2 (DPVC) Rule 2 (DPVC)
Malicious Benign Malicious Benign
6.5% 0.7% 1.7% 91.1%
Table 2 e Assurance scores for the benign and malicious
components in some repackaged malware apps.
Repackaged malware
name
Assurance
score of benign
component
Assurance score
of malicious
component
com.noisysounds 90% 26%
com.miniarmy.engine 100% 35%
com.chenyx.tiltmazs 78% 20%
com.craigsrace.
headtoheadrcing
86% 28%
Table 5 e Average feature-extraction time for an app.
Procedure Average time (sec)
Reachability Analysis 14.17
Finding Dependence Paths 54.30
AndroidManifest.xml Parsing 0.01
Graph Construction using Soot 89.53
Total Time 158.01
6 Out of the 240 apps, 137 apps triggers at least one alert in
VirusTotal.
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observe the imbalance. Table 2 shows the results of our
assurance scores V for the benign and malicious components
separately for some of the repackaged malware apps. The V
scores for the benign components are much higher than the
malicious components which show the validity of our pro-
posed feature.
5.3. Free popular apps
Because the ground truth on trustworthiness of the free
popular apps are not known, our analysis on them is more
complex. Some of the classification decisions are validated
through significantmanual inspection of the code.We present
our results on the i) assurance score computation, ii) classifi-
cations using two rules, and iii) new malware discovery.
5.3.1. Assurance scores of free apps
Among the 2684 free popular apps, 80.5% of them have 100%
assurance scores, indicating that all the call sites of all the
sensitive operations have valid user-trigger dependence. The
detailed distribution of the assurance scores are shown in
Fig. 6. For the 80.5% of the apps that have 100% assurance
scores, we utilized a signature-based malware scanning tool
VirusTotal for additional validation. VirusTotal has 48
signature-based scanners (e.g., McAfee, NOD32, BitDefender).
We found that only one scanner out of 48 scanners in Viru-
sTotal triggers an adware alert for 13 free popular appswhich
have 100% assurance scores (true positives). The rest of the
free popular apps with 100% assurance scores are benign (true
negatives), none of them trigger any alert by VirusTotal.
Through manual inspection, we find that the use of adver-
tisement and analytics libraries is one main reason for sensi-
tive operations to be called without proper user triggers. We
selected several apps with less-than-100% V scores and
computed their assurance scores with and without the ad/an-
alytics libraries. TheV scores are boosted significantly without
the ad/analytics libraries. The results are shown in Table 3.
We also found a few malicious apps with high enough
assurance scores (e.g., V is 89%) to pass our classification
threshold (i.e., false negative), e.g., a spyware wallpaper app
com.ysler.wps.d3d available on Google Play market.
5.3.2. Classification results of free popular apps
Our classification results are summarized in Table 4. Most of
these free popular apps fromGoogle Playmarket are classified
as benign by both rules. Rule 1 labels 7.2% (193) of the 2684 apps
asmalicious.We thenappliedRule 2 to both categories of apps.For apps classifiedasmaliciousbyRule 1.WeappliedRule 2
to these 7.2% of the apps. Rule 2 labels 6.5% of the total (175 of
193) as malicious. The other 0.7% (18) are labeled benign.
For apps classified as benign by Rule 1.We applied Rule 2 to
these 92.8% of the apps. Rule 2 labels 1.7% (47) of them as
malicious, and classifies the rest 91.1% as benign.
There are 240 apps that are labeled as malicious by both or
either one of the rules. Their popularity distribution is as fol-
lows, with higher concentrations of suspicious apps in me-
dium and low popularity categories.
 High popularity category: 70 apps (29.2%)
 Medium popularity category: 87 apps (36.3%)
 Low popularity category: 83 apps (34.5%)
To confirm the correctness of our results, we then per-
formed various code inspection on them, the detail of which
are described next.
5.3.3. New malicious apps found
To confirm that the apps classified as malicious are truly
malicious, manual code inspection was performed. We also
utilized the VirusTotal for additional validation.
Our method discoveredmany newmalicious Android apps
that cannot be detected by the VirusTotal tool.6 These new
malware apps did not trigger any alerts in VirusTotal. A subset
of these new malicious apps is shown in Table 6 with
Table 6 e Malicious activities of a subset of new malware found by our method.
App name Access IMEI/Device Info Access user ID Access geolocation Access IP address Access bookmark Load code dynamically Send SMS
com.pougamefree.cheatsa getDeviceId() e getLongitude() e getAllBookmarks() e e
getLatitude()
com.canny.FishHunter getDeviceId() e getLongitude() e getAllBookmarks() e e
getLine1Number() getLatitude()
getSimSerialNumber() getLastKnownLocation()
getSubscriberId() getAccuracy()
getLatitude()
getLastKnownLocation()
com.hd.peliculashda getDeviceId() e getLongitude() getIpAddress() e e e
getLatitude()
getLastKnownLocation()
getAccuracy()
oms.cj.kobodl getDeviceId() e getLongitude() e e e e
getLine1Number() getLatitude()
getSimSerialNumber()
com.canny.RankSwap getDeviceId() e getLongitude() e getAllBookmarks() e e
getLine1Number() getLatitude()
getSimSerialNumber() getLastKnownLocation()
getSubscriberId() getAccuracy()
com.via3apps.relation958 getDeviceId() e getLongitude() e e e e
getLatitude()
getLastKnownLocation()
com.berobo.android.scanner getDeviceId() getAccounts() getLongitude() getIpAddress() e loadClass() sendTextMessage()
getLine1Number() getLatitude()
getLastKnownLocation()
getAccuracy()
com.Amazing***BibleFree e e getLongitude() e e e e
getLatitude()
getAccuracy()
a App has been removed from Google play market by 12/05/2013.
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7 Google later took somemalware apps off the Play market, e.g.,
Us-Obesity-And-You-Teenagers.
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user-trigger dependence. All of them are confirmed by our
manual analysis to have malicious functionalities. In Table 6,
each column is a category of malicious action, e.g., unjustified
dynamic code loading and unnecessary accessing of user in-
formation. Names of call sites without valid user-trigger
dependence are given. All the apps shown in this table fail
both of our classification rules, yet do not trigger any alerts in
VirusTotal.
We highlight a few of the newmalware that we discovered
in the free popular apps. Our method detects a malicious app
Time Machine, which is repackaged from an ebook app. The
malware invokes many sensitive APIs (in Jslibs library) to
perform unjustified operations, such as recording sound,
retrieving phone state, and exfiltrating geolocation informa-
tion. We find that an organizer app com.via3ap-
ps.usobesit618 is bundled with a piece of malware
collecting private information, such as device ID, email
address, latitude and longitude, phone number, and user-
name, and it uploads the details to a remote server. Another
malware app is a game-guide app com.bfrs.krokr, which is
bundled with adware AndroidApperhand (aka Android.-
Counterclank). AndroidApperhand is a piece of aggressive
adware. It attempts to modify the browser's home page, copy
bookmarks on the device, shortcuts, push notifications, and
steal build information (brand, device, manufacturer, model).
This adware also attempts to connect to a remote host.
For the apps that are labeled as malicious by only one rule
(2.4% out of 2684 apps), we have confirmed that most of the
apps (2.2% of 2.4%) contain aggressive advertisement libraries,
such as Mobclix, Tapjoy, and Waps. These libraries invoke
sensitive operations without any user triggers. Unlike regular
ad libraries, these aggressive ad libraries contain an over-
whelming amount of invalid call sites. Most of them have a
large number (>50%) of sensitive operations with zero valid
call sites, which is consistent with known malware. Other
researchers have also confirmed the potential security issues
raised by these aggressive ad libraries Grace et al. (2012a).
5.3.4. False positive rate (FPR)
FPR is computed as FP/FP þ TN, where TN stands for true
negative (benign apps). 240 apps are classified as malicious
by our method. VirusTotal scanning confirms 137 of them
are malicious. For the rest of 103 apps, we randomly
selected 21 apps out of these 103 apps and perform a
thorough manually code inspection. We found that 11 of
the 21 apps have definitive malicious or aggressive code
behaviors that threaten the system assurance and data
confidentiality in Android (described in Section 5.3.3 and
Table 6). These behaviors were found in either the main
components or adware. In the other 10 apps we did not find
any threats, thus concluded that they are benign (false
positives). The total false positives are estimated at 103 * 10/
21 ¼ 49. Since the trustworthiness of the free popular apps
is unknown, we used VirusTotal to check all the free
popular apps classified as benign by our method (true
negatives). We found that only one scanner out of 48
scanners in VirusTotal triggers an adware alert for 27 apps
(true positives). The true negatives (TN) are
2684  240 þ 49  27 ¼ 2466, yielding a 2.0% FPR.5.4. Performance evaluation
The experiments were conducted on a computer which has
3.0 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo CPU E8400 processor and 3 GB of RAM.
We measure the time for parsing the AndroidManifest.xml
file, Soot execution for constructing the dependence graph,
the reachability analysis, and finding the dependence paths by
traversing the graph. The average processing time for an app
is about 158.01 s. This processing time does not include the
time required to convert the dex format to jar. Table 5 shows
the average time required by each analysis phase.
5.5. Summary
These experimental results suggest that our rule-based clas-
sification with a single complex feature is quite effective. We
summarize our major experimental findings.
1. There are an overwhelming number of malware apps with
zero or low assurance scores, indicating that a large portion
of sensitive call sites in these programs are invalid. The
DPVC vectors (representing a fine-grained distribution of
per-operation valid call sites) of malware and benign apps
have significantly different distributions (shown in Fig. 5).
Malware has a high concentration of zero or low per-
operation valid call sites.
2. We obtained a low false negative (i.e., missed detection)
rate of 2.1% when classifying 1433 known malware sam-
ples based on their assurance scores and DPVC vectors,
suggesting the effectiveness of our detection.
3. Our method identified 240 free popular apps (8.9%) as sus-
picious from Google Play market.7 These malware exces-
sively access device resources and personal information
without anyuser knowledge. Our programanalysismethod
effectively pinpoints these problematic call sites. Our
method detects many malware that cannot be detected by
VirusTotal scanning. Some of them are shown in Table 6.
We confirmed them by manual code inspection. Our false
positive rate (FP/FP þ TN) is estimated at 2.0%. Our method
identified more suspicious apps from the medium and low
popularity categories than the high popularity category.
4. We observed several types of triggerless operations that are
benign.Sensitiveoperationsduring i)applaunchingactivities
(e.g., default_app_set.main.ver1), ii) background service
components (e.g., com.monotype.android.font.dev.-
comic), or iii) benign ad/analytical libraries (e.g., rappsd.v1)
are typically automatically completed without user triggers.
These factors result in lower assurance scores and skewed
DPVC vectors, which may cause false positives. The classifi-
cation accuracy is also affected by the accuracy of Dare in
translating Dalvik bytecode to Java bytecode.6. Discussion
In this section, we discuss the security guarantees provided by
our app classification work, and sources of inaccuracy in our
8 http://proguard.sourceforge.net/.
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feature definitions.
6.1. Security analysis
Our app classification can be used to detect malware that in-
vokes sensitive operations. Sensitive operations typically
involve accessing system resources and sensitive data. Infer-
ring their user-intention dependences enables the detection
of potential data confidentiality and authorization issues.
Examples of malicious patterns that can be detected by our
analysis include:
 Resource access: executing sensitive operations without
proper user triggers, such as sending unauthorized SMS
messages, subscribing to premium-rate services automat-
ically, or granting unauthorized root privilege to apps.
 Data access: accessing sensitive data items without proper
user triggers, such as recording and uploading the victim's
current location. Our static analysis does not track sensi-
tive data variables. Instead, the function calls that may be
used to access sensitive data are labeled (as operations)
and analyzed.
In our model, the accuracy of the analysis is closely related
to the accuracy of the data dependence analysis. Intra-
procedural analysis captures fine-grained def-use relations
within a function. The intra-procedural def-use relations can
prevent a superfluous user input attack, thusly. One possible
attack scenario is where themalwaremay require superfluous
user inputs (before making function calls to conduct unau-
thorized activities) attempting to satisfy the dependence, but
the user inputs are not consumed by the calls. For example,
the user enters a phone number and a message to send SMS.
The phone number entered by the user can be ignored and
replaced with other number inside sendTextMessage()
function. This type of data flow can be detected by tracking the
dependence between the user inputs entered and the sensi-
tive API calls, thus the superfluous user inputs can be
identified.
Social engineering app is an application that provides fake
user interface to look legitimate in order to circumvent the
user and perform malicious activities (e.g., stealing money).
Social engineering apps may demonstrate proper trigger-
operation dependences, because of the seemingly conform-
ing dependence paths between user triggers and sensitive
operations. Therefore, due to the intrinsic nature of our user-
intention analysis, it is not suitable for detecting social engi-
neering apps. Possible solutions for this could be using app
certification and user education.
The legitimate apps which require few user interactions
may raise false alarm. For example, a calendar app can send
an automatic reminder email message of a calendar event
that previously scheduled by the user. Hence, the sensitiveAPI
that sends the email messagemay raise an alarm according to
our security model since it is not explicitly triggered by the
user. For example, the user has previously entered this event
into the calendar. This action can be used as a trigger that
justifies the operation of sending reminder emails. Our
approach can be extended to address this problem byexpanding and generalizing the definition of user triggers. The
analysis for this calendar problem will be more complicated
than our current solution. The reason is that the information
entered by the user is stored in a data structure or file to be
read back when it is needed. Hence, there is no direct
dependence between sending reminder email operation and
the original user triggers used to store the information. One
needs to expand and include this type of indirect dependence
relation.
For the rule-based method, it is easy for the malware
writers to game with the analysis than the machine learning-
based classification. This is because the machine learning
techniques utilize a large number of features compared to the
rule-based method. So, it is harder for the attacker to
compromise since she/he has to deal with many features in
order to circumvent the security solution. On the other hand,
the rule-based method might be easy for the attacker to
compromise since she/he has to deal with a one/fewer num-
ber of features.
Precisely modeling a program's semantics and intention is
in general challenging and open problem. In the seminal work
on computer virus Cohen (1987), Cohen described the seminal
impossibility result on malware analysis. The defense is still
an open problem and similar arm-race issue exists in virtually
all security solutions.
6.2. Sources of inaccuracy in feature extraction
Overestimation of trigger-operation dependence may cause
false negatives in the analysis report (i.e., failing to detect
potentially malicious operations in the app). Certain depen-
dence paths may only exist under specific data or control
conditions. These branch conditions may not be statically
predictable, resulting in overestimation. Some data depen-
dence overestimation may be mitigated by identifying the
specific conditions for certain dependence paths to be valid
(e.g., by symbolic execution).
Conversely, underestimation of triggers may cause false
positives. For instance, legitimate API calls can be triggered by
runtime events such as clock-driven events from the calendar
(e.g., the calendar app sends a reminder email message of a
calendar event), or triggered by incoming network events.
These runtime events may not be explicitly triggered by the
user and thus lack the proper dependence according to our
security model. One mitigation to the problem is to generalize
and expand our definitions of triggers to include other legiti-
mate triggering events. However, because triggers may be
generated at runtime, static analysis alone may not be suffi-
cient for feature extraction. Hybrid features extracted from
both static and dynamic analyses are needed for complete
dependence properties in a program. Its realization remains
an interesting open problem.
Static program analysis has difficulty in performing the
analysis on programs that employs obfuscation or encryption
techniques. Obfuscation is mainly used to make the programs
code difficult to understand.
Some Android apps use obfuscation to protect intellectual
property Enck et al. (2011). ProGuard8 is a recommended
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does not obfuscate control flow. Hence, its impact is limited
on static program analysis.
As indicated by Enck et al. (2011), it is easy to recognize
some forms of the obfuscated code in Android apps. In
particular, class, method, variable, and Java filename names
are converted to single letters (e.g., a.java). However, several
ads and analytics libraries are obfuscated to protect their
intellectual property Enck et al. (2011). To obtain a rough
estimate of the number of apps whose main code is obfus-
cated not the ads or analytics libraries, we used the same
approach proposed in Enck et al. (2011) to search for a single
letter Java filename (e.g., a.java) within a file path of the
package name. This heuristic is used to obtain insight for
finding obfuscation code in apps, but it is not a solid char-
acterization.We found only 40malware apps (2.8%) out of the
1433 apps have this code obfuscation. Moreover, we found
250 free popular apps (9.3%) out of the 2684 apps have this
code obfuscation in part of their main code. Hence, we can
infer from this statistics that the majority of the apps do not
heavily employ code obfuscation. We applied our analysis on
the reversed engineering Java bytecode using Dare tool to
translate Dalivk bytecode to Java bytecode. The accuracy of
our analysis is constrained by the accuracy of the reverse
engineering tools.
There are several obfuscation techniques:
 Renaming technique: it renames classes, variables, and
methods usingmeaningless names. This type of technique
can not affect our approach since it just renames classes,
variables, and methods without changing the content or
the control flow structure.
 String encryption technique: it encrypts the string data.
 Control flow obfuscation technique: it reorders the code
and inserts additional code statements while preserving
the code semantic.
The latter two techniques can affect our approach since
they change the data and the structure of the program. On
possible solution is to use dynamic analysis Newsome and
Song (2005); Yin et al. (2007) to provide insights about the
programs runtime execution. As a future work, we plan to
utilize the dynamic analysis with our user trigger dependence
approach to get insights on which sensitive APIs are triggered
by user inputs/actions. On way to do this is to label the user
inputs/actions and to interpose the sensitive APIs in .apk file
and insert monitoring code to get the sensitive API call logs
during the app execution.7. Related work
We categorize related Android app analysis work into i) clas-
sification with static features and ii) classification with dy-
namic or hybrid features. Both approaches are necessary for
evaluating app security, providing complementary behavioral
profiles.9 We compare some of the existing mobile app clas-
sification solutions in Table 7.9 Not all related papers report both FP and FN rates.7.1. Classification with static features
In order to infer the trustworthiness of mobile applications,
multiple approaches have been proposed to statically extract
properties of a program from its code and/or its requested
permissions (e.g., Peng et al. (2012); Sanz et al. (2012)). One of
the earliest such work is SCanDroid Fuchs et al. (2009).
SCanDroid Fuchs et al. (2009) proposed to extract security
specifications from the app's manifest and check whether the
data-flows through the app are consistent with the stated
specifications.10
The solution by Peng et al. (2012) calculated risk scores
from the permissions requested by Android apps and found
the hierarchical mixture of naive Bayes to be the best classifier
for the risk score based app classification. The work by Sanz
et al. (2012) also extracted permission-usage based features,
and evaluated several classifiers including random forests,
naive Bayes, and Bayesian network. The false positive rate in
Sanz et al. (2012) is higher than 11%.
DroidAPIMiner Aafer et al. (2013) extracted features related
to API calls, and evaluated severalmachine learning classifiers
including k-nearest neighbor (KNN), decision tree, and sup-
port vector machines. It achieves a 97.8% detection rate of the
malware samples and a false positive rate of 2.2% with KNN.
Drebin Arp et al. (2014) analyzed AndroidManifest.xml and
disassembled code to extract features on requested permis-
sions and API calls, and used support vector machines (SVM)
as a classifier. Drebin achieves 94% detection rate of the
malware samples at a false positive rate of 1%. Bothwork used
multiple sets of features as opposed to our work. A recent
paper Wolfe et al. (2014) on Android malware classification
utilizes the assurance score feature and dozens of other
manifest-based features. The solution by Wolfe et al. (2014)
achieves similar accuracy as ours. It utilizes a significant
number of features than our work. It employs machine
learning techniques, as opposed to our simple rule-based
classification.
In comparison to the above permission-based classifica-
tion, features extracted from code analysis are more fine-
grained and specific. We highlight several such solutions
next. The security goal in AndroidLeaks Gibler et al. (2012),
SCANDAL Kim et al. (2012), and PiOS Egele et al. (2011) for iOS
is focused on detecting data leak vulnerabilities, specifically
on information flow for confidentiality analysis. The methods
label sensitive data/sources and potentially risky sinks (typi-
cally network API calls) and report when there are data-
leaking dependence paths between them. PiOS reports a 13%
false negative rate.
Although using dependence-path based analysis, our def-
initions for the path have different semantics. As a result, our
analysis with a complete coverage of sensitive operations
provides comprehensive app profiling, which offers more
protection than data confidentiality. For example, our analysis
also detects system-assurance-related operations such as
unauthorized camera access or recording, which is out of the
scope the data leak solutions.
Multiple features were utilized to make classification de-
cisions in RiskRanker Grace et al. (2012b). The classification is10 No experimental results were reported in SCanDroid.
Table 7 e Comparison with related mobile app classification work.
Solution Aim Feature
type
# Featuresa Feature
Categoryb
Classification
policy/Algorithm
Evaluation scale Apps collected from Classification
Accuracy
AndroidLeaks
Gibler et al.
(2012)
Confidentiality Static S DS Rule: sensitive data used
by risky APIs
24,350 apps various Android markets FP ¼ 35%
Crowdroid
Burguera et al.
(2011)
Malware classification Dynamic M DI k-means clustering 3 self-written malware and
2 real malware
VirusTotal FP ¼ 20%
Amos et al. (2013) Malware classification Dynamic M DI naive Bayes, Bayes nets,
MLP, logistic regression,
RF, DT
training (408 benign, 1330
malware), testing
(24 benign, 23 malware)
Android malware genome
project, VirusTotal, Google Play
FP ¼ 15%
PiOS Egele et al.
(2011)
Confidentiality Static S DS Rule: sensitive data used
by risky APIs
1407 apps Apple's iTunes, BigBoss FN ¼ 13%
Sanz et al. (2012) Malware classification Static M DI logistic regression, naive
Bayes, Bayes nets, SVM,
KNN, DT, RF
1811 benign, 249 malware Google Play, VirusTotal FP ¼ 11%
Andromaly
Shabtai et al.
(2012)
Malware classification Dynamic M DI naive Bayes, Bayes nets,
histograms, k-means,
LR, DT
4 self-written malware,
40 benign
Google Play FP ¼ 10%
RiskRanker
Grace et al.
(2012b)
Detection of abnormal
code/behavior patterns
Static M DS Rule: multiple malware
behavior signatures
118,318 apps various Android markets FN ¼ 9%
Peng et al. (2012) Risk assessment Static M DI different probabilistic
generative models
model generation & testing
(71,331 apps) validation
(136,534 apps), 378 malware
Google Play, Android malware
genome project
FP ¼ 4%
DroidAPIMiner
Aafer et al.
(2013)
Malware classification Static M DI KNN, DT, SVM 16,000 benign, 3987 malware Google Play, Android malware
genome project, McAfee
FP ¼ 2.2% FN ¼ 2.2%
Drebin Arp et al.
(2014)
Malware classification Static M DI SVM 123,453 benign, 5560 malware various markets, malware
forums and security blogs,
Android malware genome
project
FP ¼ 1% FN ¼ 6%
Ours Identification of
unauthorized API calls
Static S DS Rule: trigger-based
dependence for privileged
API calls
2684 benign, 1433 malware Google Play, VirusShare,
Android malware genome
project
FP ¼ 2% FN ¼ 2.1%
a Number of features: single feature (S) or multiple features (M).
b Feature category: domain-specific (DS) or domain-independent (DI).
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extracted through control-flow and intra-method data-flow
analyses. An example of such suspicious behaviors include
accessing sensitive data in a dependence path that also con-
tains decryption (usually for deobfuscation) and execution
methods. RiskRanker reports a 9% false negative rate. In
comparison, our method enforces benign properties of trust-
worthy programs (as opposed to detecting malicious proper-
ties). Our results also show better classification accuracy
compared to the existing approaches.
DroidSIFT Zhang et al. (2014) is a recent Android malware
classification system that is based on constructing depen-
dence graphs to model the dependences between API calls. Its
feature vector is extracted from the graphs. The work built
graph databases for known benign and malicious Android
apps, and performed graph similarity queries (based on graph
edit distance) for unknown apps. Its approach correctly clas-
sifies 93% of known malware samples (with naive Bayes
classifier). Their anomaly detector based on the benign graph
database achieves a false negative rate of 2% and a false
positive rate of 5.15%. The semantics of dependence proper-
ties in our work and DroidSIFT are different. Our work models
the data dependency between user-input functions and sen-
sitive APIs. Consequently, the classification mechanisms are
different. Our solution e based on rules e does not rely on
graph similarity computation, which might be expensive for
large graphs.
7.2. Classification with dynamic or hybrid features
Solutions in this category detect malware apps by their run-
time execution patterns (i.e., dynamic features), sometimes
together with statically extracted features. Andromaly
Shabtai et al. (2012) and Amos et al. (2013) extract dynamic
features including memory activity and CPU load to classify
Android apps. They apply several classifiers including deci-
sion trees, naive Bayes, and Bayesian networks. The best
classifier in Andromaly Shabtai et al. (2012) achieves a 10.4%
false positive rate. In Amos et al. (2013) the false positive rate is
over 15%. The work by Liu et al. (2009) detected malicious
behaviors on mobile devices by monitoring abnormal power
consumption due to malware activities, and reports a false
positive rate that ranges from 4.3% to 10%.
Crowdroid Burguera et al. (2011) performs k-means clus-
tering algorithms on dynamic features collected fromAndroid
apps. The features are the frequencies of occurrences for
system calls (e.g., open(), kill()) executed by an app. The
proposed solution successfully identifies all of the author-
created malware, while it reports a 20% false positive rate on
the real-world repackaged malware.
The features in DroidRanger Zhou et al. (2012) are hybrid. It
statically extracts behavioral signatures of known malware
samples. Examples of static features include sequences of
APIs being called, package names, and class hierarchies. It
also has a dynamic execution monitor that inspects the sus-
picious runtime behaviors of the app, such as loading dy-
namic code. The method reports a false negative rate of 4.2%.
These dynamic analysis provides useful information on
runtime program behaviors and complements our static anal-
ysiswork.Bothapproachesarenecessary forappclassification.7.3. Non-classification work
Several validation and verification solutions have been pro-
posed for mobile platforms to enhance the assurance of
execution. These tools gather contextual information associ-
ated with sensitive operation invocations. This information is
comparedwithmodels built through hybrid programanalysis.
For example, AppIntent Yang et al. (2013) defines privacy
leakage as user-unintended data transmission. It provides a
security analyst the context information associated with the
transmission. The human analyst then decides whether the
transmission is legitimate or not. Pegasus Chen et al. (2013)
proposes a Permission Event Graph abstraction in order to
detect sensitive operation invocations that are inconsistent
with the UI events. It automatically verifies the app's behav-
iors with respect to pre-defined app-specific policies. CHEX Lu
et al. (2012) identifies potentially vulnerable component in-
terfaces that are exposed to the public without proper access
restrictions in Android apps. The analysis detects apps that
are vulnerable, but not necessarily malicious. The authors
utilized data-flow based reachability analysis. CHEX reports a
false positive rate of 19%. ComDroid Chin et al. (2011) char-
acterizes security vulnerabilities caused by Android inter-app
communication. User-driven access control gadget (ACG) was
proposed in Roesner et al. (2012) to capture user authorization
actions (keyboard shortcut or mouse movement) for assured
resource access at runtime. Unlike ours, these solutions are
not for malware classification, thus have different security
goals and technical approaches from ours.8. Conclusions and future work
Wedemonstrated the high classification accuracy achieved by
using a single well-prepared feature on Java programs. What
differs our feature from those used in existing work is that our
classification enforces carefully-chosen benign properties in
programs. These benign properties are observed in trust-
worthy programs, but not in malware. Our enforcement of
these benign properties through mobile app classification al-
lows defenders to stay ahead of the game in the eternal
armrace between attack and defense Cohen (1987).
For future work, we plan to generalize the dependence
definitions to include non-user triggers.We also plan to utilize
advanced program analysis techniques to further improve the
classification accuracy. For the deployment perspective, we
plan to provide and present informative and intuitive inter-
pretation of the multiple dimensional analysis results from
various tools to users.r e f e r e n c e s
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